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The events of 30 June 1934 had shown that there was some disaffection within the Nazi party. It was perhaps only a matter of time before the German people saw sense, abandoned National Socialism and looked to Britain and France to help reinstate democracy. But in the meantime, a contingency plan of military and mutual assistance alliances was necessary should that eventuality not come about. The diary contains numerous references to Mein Kampf, and it is clear that Phipps views its content as a blueprint for Hitler’s strategy, particularly in foreign affairs.

Being unaware of the views of His Majesty’s Government on the subject, I merely replied that its great drawback seemed to me that it implied German rearmament rather than an offer of disarmament, and I asked whether Germany would not prefer the latter. General von Blomberg smiled and replied that he certainly would but, although England had perhaps disarmed more than was strictly necessary, both the Chancellor and he were firmly convinced that France had no intention of disarming. Moreover, real disarmament would mean that 40 million French would be confronted by 65 million Germans and to this he considered it was impossible to ask the French to agree.

5 Simon, concerned at Phipps’ boldness, asked him to smooth things over with the Germans so that an atmosphere conducive to re-starting the disarmament negotiations could be created. Simon had taken heart by Mussolini’s willingness to denounce the German withdrawal. Hitler undoubtedly required special handling, but a possible way forward, brokered by Mussolini, lay open for the disarmament negotiations to continue. Furthermore, the 1933 25 Duce might bring pressure to bear on Hitler to return to the Disarmament Conference.