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The frigid climatic conditions contrasted with the beginnings of a thaw in international relations at this time. Building on the initial contacts of late 1969, a variety of odd couples arranged to meet face-to-face in the first half of 1970. In January, Egon Bahr headed to Moscow to begin negotiations with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. ’’ The game’s other half comprised Soviet-GDR bilateral relations. These were severely strained by the dramatic events accompanying the first face-to-face meeting between Willy Brandt and his East German equivalent Willi Stoph.

Ulbricht would frequently refer to his decades at the top of Communist politics as a means of asserting his own authority, to the annoyance of his colleagues not only in East setting the stage 29 Berlin but also in Moscow. ∞≤∑ Ulbricht believed his seniority and the experience of having weathered many storms in office entitled him to show ideological daring. It also, he thought, entitled him to advise Brezhnev, rather than the other way around. ∞≤π Other key figures on the East German side of negotiations could draw on decades of ruling experience at the top level before 1969 as well.

It suggested that the SED might believe in a different interpretation of Marxism than Moscow, namely a less predetermined version in which history might not necessarily culminate in communism. ∂∫ A contradiction emerges: while Ulbricht felt free to show ideological daring himself, he condemned the heretical deviations occurring in Prague. SED documents contain critical remarks from Ulbricht about Prague throughout 1968. Ulbricht’s main objection seems to have been that the Prague reformers’ actions produced risks not just for themselves but also for the entire Warsaw pact.