By Jake Blood
A close examination of the position of intelligence in shaping America’s conception of the Vietnam War, having a look heavily on the intelligence management and determination technique. In 1967, intelligence used to be known as upon to strengthen help for the Vietnam warfare and allowed America’s leaders to painting a ‘bankrupt’ enemy able to surrender the battlefield. The audacious Tet Offensive of 1968 shattered this photograph and even though it ended with an American army victory, it really is remembered because the juncture whilst American aid became opposed to the battle. Public opinion at the battle was once a prime drawback for the Johnson management, and US intelligence performed a decisive position in offering an excessively confident view of the enemy’s death. because the "bankrupt" enemy attacked with a ferocity and depth that stunned the yankee public, intelligence had set-up the yank public for a fall. How, americans desired to understand, might an enemy whose numbers have been so decimated now release such an all-out offensive? From this exam and an knowing of the way the enemy seen itself, the realization is made that 4 critical breaches of intelligence etiquette happened in the course of the interval best as much as Tet. This phenomenon is the ‘Tet impression’ – the lack of credibility while leaders painting a scenario dependent upon intelligence that's proven to be disingenuous. This publication could be of significant curiosity to scholars of the Vietnam struggle, intelligence and strategic reports in most cases.
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Additional resources for The Tet Effect: Intelligence and the Public Perception of War (Cass Military Studies)
Example text
Compounding this was the lack of clear guidance from the US leadership on just what the mission and objectives of the military were in Vietnam. Following a summit between the leaders of South Vietnam and the United States held in Honolulu, Hawaii in February of 1966, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk remained in Hawaii and met with General Westmoreland to establish goals and objectives for the military in Vietnam and a means to measure their progress. Percentages were set for securing and pacifying areas, for opening roads and railroads, and for denying enemy access to base areas.
59 With a definite end of the war in sight, the American public caught some of the optimism General Westmoreland brought with him to the United States in November 1967. 60 The number of people responding that they supported the war also halted a downward trend after General Westmoreland’s predictions. The number of people opposing the war also stopped increasing. The overall public trends, which had been increasingly anti-war, were halted in November 1967. The public seemed willing to await a verdict on the validity of General Westmoreland’s words.
MACV was originally set up in 1954 under the Eisenhower administration as the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), with a strictly advisory mission. In 1955, the MAAG mission was expanded to organize, train, and equip the military forces of South Vietnam. US military personnel were to train, organize, and equip, but not fight for the South Vietnamese, and were not even permitted to accompany them on operational missions. This changed in 1961 under President Kennedy when he authorized US personnel to accompany South Vietnamese military units into the field, but still only to act as advisors.