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Two major monetary reporters dissect this monetary elite, tracing their origins to a secretive amassing of free-market economists in 1947, and suggest a chain of far-reaching reforms which may shop us from a brand new depression.
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Second, and somewhat implausibly given the abortive discussions of the previous few weeks, there was still hope that a bid from Lloyds TSB could be arranged. Unsurprisingly, that hope proved forlorn. The lines formed once more outside branches and by Monday afternoon, with shares falling in Alliance & Leicester and Bradford & Bingley, two other vulnerable UK banks, it was clear that there could be no further delay. Darling used a press conference with Paulson to announce that deposits in Northern Rock, and any other bank that might experience similar difficulties, would be guaranteed.
2 billion to bail out the two funds. It made little difference; the funds filed for bankruptcy anyway. The news did not get any better during the fall. A few days after the collapse of Northern Rock in the UK, Bear Stearns announced that third quarter profits were down 61 percent to $171 million. At this stage, though, there was still hope that the financial storm would—like that of LTCM in 1998—quickly blow over. ” They weren’t. ” It wasn’t. Cayne and Schwartz were right about one thing, however: banks needed to be very careful about touting around for partners willing to inject the fresh capital needed to make up for the losses on subprime.
With one last growl of its shareholders, Bear Stearns was gone. If there was a tiny crumb of comfort for what was then America’s fifth biggest investment bank (a sector of the economy that six months later had gone the way of the dodo), it was that it avoided the long, lingering death of Britain’s banking basket case—Northern Rock. The Rock, as it was known, had been on life support for five months when the British government finally realized that the lack of a private sector bidder for the bank meant there was no alternative but nationalization.