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Personnel who were willing to lose their lives had to be selected and groomed. They had to undergo training that was costly and risky, because it took a long time and exposed ‘‘sleeper’’ operatives to risks, such as taking flying lessons and using false identities to obtain driver’s licenses. Finally, ways had to be devised to gain control of aircraft without traditional weapons, which were, in principle at least, subject to search by airline security. The use of box cutters as weapons along with hand-to-hand combat training was another innovative solution.

However, we can and we must make their attacks more difficult. In doing so, we can reduce their frequency and deadliness and discourage others from copying the attacks. S. S. airliners. Hijackers did not displace their attacks to airliners in other countries—the growth in airline hijackings elsewhere is mainly the result of new conflicts. The antihijacking measures did not cause terrorists to switch to sabotage bombing of airliners. The 9/11 hijackers exploited loopholes in passenger and baggage screening and in the antihijacking training given to airliner crews.

In the following chapters, we begin to address the practical demands of uncovering the opportunities available for each type of terrorist act and to think through each step of these acts from initial planning to their cataclysmic ends. We show that it is possible to identify and protect the most vulnerable targets. And we show it is possible to cut off the terrorists’ access to the tools and weapons that make their task easier. These are very difficult tasks, however, requiring considerable resources and determination to see them through.