By Frank Camm, Lauren Caston, Alexander C. Hou, Forrest E. Morgan, Alan J. Vick
Provides a risk-management strategy may aid senior Air strength leaders to (1) concentration making plans at the such a lot salient threats, (2) achieve higher readability at the hazards linked to replacement classes of motion throughout a number of futures, (3) preserve a feeling of the chronic uncertainties linked to any coverage selection, and (4) successfully speak their judgments approximately danger to key audiences.
Read Online or Download Managing Risk in USAF Planning PDF
Similar intelligence & espionage books
Courting Disaster: How the CIA Kept America Safe and How Barack Obama Is Inviting the Next Attack
White condominium speechwriter Marc Thiessen was once locked in a safe room and given entry to the main delicate intelligence whilst he was once tasked to write down President George W. Bush’s 2006 speech explaining the CIA’s interrogation software and why Congress should still authorize it. Few comprehend extra approximately those CIA operations than Thiessen, and in his new e-book, dating catastrophe, he records simply how powerful the CIA’s interrogations have been in foiling assaults on the US, penetrating al-Qaeda’s excessive command, and offering our army with actionable intelligence.
The Only Thing Worth Dying For: How Eleven Green Berets Forged a New Afghanistan
On a moonless evening simply weeks after September eleven, 2001, U. S. exact Forces staff ODA 574 infiltrates the mountains of southern Afghanistan with a doubtless most unlikely project: to foment a tribal riot and strength the Taliban to give up. Armed exclusively with the gear they could stick with it their backs, shockingly scant intelligence, and their mastery of guerrilla war, Captain Jason Amerine and his males don't have any selection yet to belief their in basic terms best friend, a little-known Pashtun statesman named Hamid Karzai who has lower back from exile and is being hunted by way of the Taliban as he travels the nation-state elevating a military.
Operation Snow: How a Soviet Mole in FDR's White House Triggered Pearl Harbor
Lately declassified facts and never-before-translated records inform the true tale of the day that FDR memorably declared might reside in infamy, exploring how Joseph Stalin and the KGB used an unlimited community of double brokers and communist sympathizers—most particularly Harry Dexter White—to lead Japan into conflict opposed to the us, featuring Soviet involvement in the back of the bombing of Pearl Harbor.
Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis
This booklet tracks publish 11th of September advancements in nationwide safeguard and policing intelligence and their relevance to new rising components of intelligence perform akin to: corrections, biosecurity, inner most and regulatory environments. advancements are explored thematically throughout 3 huge sections: utilizing intelligence realizing constructions constructing a self-discipline.
Additional info for Managing Risk in USAF Planning
Example text
If it can have little effect, the investment offers no value and would effectively be wasted (Box 4). If the investment is potentially useful, we can then ask how it actually affects the outcome of the threat that becomes active (Box 5). If it contributes to an operational success (Box 6)—the FOB continues to operate effectively through the attack, allowing forces at the base to stay in the fight— it creates value that can be used to help justify the initial investment. If it does not help prevent an operational failure (Box 7), because the base must shut down for so long that broader operational capability is threatened, no value accrues.
Or does the threat fail to become active because the potential adversary has no interest in starting a war or attacking a particular target (Box 10)? In this case, the investment would be wasted. We have seen many reasons the investment might be a bad idea. The tree returns us to Box 1, where the policymaker has now decided not to invest in the capability in question. FOBs remain vulnerable to air attack. We can now ask again in Box 11, as we did in Box 2, whether the threat that would justify the investment ever becomes active over the planning horizon.
It is tempting to say that, for any major decision, decisionmakers and planners can only speculate about the answers to such questions. A more constructive way to express this is to say that decisionmakers and planners can and must construct subjective beliefs about such answers. The subjectivity implicit in the tree diagram is not a weakness of some kind that we can avoid; it is a quality of the future that we must accept and work with as honestly as possible. 1. One of the most important products of a career of military experience is (presumably latent) knowledge relevant to making just such assessments.